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IMMIGRATION AND HOUSING RENTS IN AMERICAN CITIES
Abstract
Is there a local economic impact of immigration? Immigration pushes up rents and housing values
in destination cities. The positive association of rent growth and immigrant inflows is pervasive in
time series for all metropolitan areas. I use instrumental variables based on a “shift-share” of
national levels of immigration into metropolitan areas. Conditioning on other variables, an
immigration inflow equal to 1% of the city population is associated with increases in rents and
housing values of about 1%. The results suggest an economic impact that is an order of
magnitude bigger than that found on labor markets.

Keywords: Immigration, housing rents
JEL: J61, R23, R31

1.

Introduction

Immigration continues to be one of the most important factors in the demographic evolution
of the United States. Immigrants and their offspring will account for as much as two thirds of
population growth from 1995 to 2050.1 And its effects will be particularly salient in the areas
where immigrants cluster. In 2000, 68 percent of all foreign-born persons (as opposed to 36
percent of the native population) lived in only six states: California, New York, Florida, Texas,
New Jersey or Illinois.2 Major American metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles,
Miami and San Francisco, have seen levels of new legal immigration equal to more than 13%
of their initial population in only fifteen years (1983-1997).3 What is the local impact of such
immigration inflows in American cities? To answer this question, economists have focused on
wage impacts and have found only small effects. 4 In this paper I argue for the importance of
the housing market and find an impact on the purchasing power of renters that is an order of
magnitude bigger than the estimates from the wage literature. The results are very important
in understanding the local distributive impact of immigration and the link between
immigration and the residential location decisions of natives.
Housing markets can no longer be ignored when studying the local economic impact of
immigration. Immigrants will represent a sort of new “baby boom” for the American housing
markets of the 21st century. Already, from 1980 to 1998, foreign-born renter households
increased their share of total renter-occupied housing from 15% to 28% in the Northeastern
and Western states. Immigrant households accounted for a third of total household growth
during the 1995-2000 period (JCHS, 2000, 2001). And immigration determines housing
demand to an even greater extent in those metropolitan areas where the foreign born tend to
settle.
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The National Research Council study (NRC, 1997) provides a comprehensive review of the demographic

importance of immigration in the United States.
2

See Passel and Zimmerman (2001).

3

In Table A.1 I show these major “immigrant cities.”

4

Studies on wage impacts represent the bulk of the research on immigration in economics. However, it is

only fair to acknowledge studies on fiscal impacts (e.g. Borjas and Hilton, 1996), natural resources (Simon,
1999, Chapter 9), college admissions for minorities (Hoxby, 1998), native self-employment (Fairlie and
Meyer, 2000), unemployment (Gross, 1999; Gang and Rivera-Batiz, 1999) and the impact of foreign teaching
fellows, like this author, on the academic performance of US undergraduates (Borjas, 2000).
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This paper uses annual data on legal immigration inflows and decennial data on the stock of
the foreign-born, housing rents, and home values at the metropolitan area level. The evidence
suggests that part of the distributive impact of immigration on local economies may come
through changes in rents and housing prices. I use longitudinal and cross-sectional data and
find that cities with major inflows of immigrants experienced higher rent growth during the
period 1983-1997. Legal immigration inflows equal to 1% of a city’s population were associated
with increases in housing rents and prices of about 1%. I include state fixed effects to account
for different regional trends that could be spuriously correlated with the immigrants’
geographic patterns of settlement. I further use annual differences in immigration inflows by
city, and find that rents accelerate when immigration inflows into a metropolitan area
accelerate. To avoid the possible endogeneity of immigration with respect to other omitted
factors that generate rent growth I use instruments based on general changes in the national
levels of immigration, on changes in the characteristics of the countries that send immigrants,
and on the distribution of immigrants in earlier periods. The association between immigration
and rent growth is not driven by local contemporaneous shocks that could be correlated with
immigration. Thus the results support a causal interpretation. I find similar results using long
differences in rents and housing prices and the cumulative number of legal immigrants by
metropolitan area during the 1983-1997 period, which do not hinge on the timing of immigrant
admissions. I also use data from the American Housing Survey to control for unit-specific
characteristics that could account for the rent results via composition effects. The results are
very robust to this alternative data set. Finally, to allay any concerns about the omission of
illegal immigrants, and to provide further alternative data sources for rents and housing prices,
I use data from the 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 US censuses. OLS regressions, instrumental
variables that use immigration levels to predict subsequent inflows, and MSA fixed effects
regressions that are identified by using within-city variation in the immigration inflows
between censuses yield similar results.
The findings in this paper contrast sharply with the results from the labor literature on
immigration (Borjas, 1994a; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995). Studies that use historical data find a
negative local association between immigration and wages in periods previous to WWI
(Goldin, 1994; Ferrie, 1996a). But remarkably, there is not much evidence of such a
relationship holding in the contemporaneous metropolitan US.5 Even unexpected immigration
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Structural models of the economy that use realistic parameters to calibrate a simple model of labor demand

predict an impact of immigration on wages at the national level (Borjas, Freeman and Katz, 1992).

2

shocks that rapidly expand the local labor supply do not seem to decrease wages (Card, 1990).
There have been so far at least three possible explanations for this surprising result. Natives
may be choosing to leave when immigrants arrive, rather than face increased competition in
the labor market (Filer, 1992); immigrants may be moving into cities with positive shocks in
productivity and wage growth; or the local labor demand may be more elastic than economists
have thought (Card and Krueger, 1995). The evidence in this work supplies the literature with
a new piece in the puzzle of the local impact of immigration. It shows a potential way in which
immigrants can have a local distributive impact. Furthermore, it suggests another major
mechanism by which immigration can affect the migration decisions of natives. Rents and
housing prices should not be neglected when thinking about the “dynamic process through
which natives respond to these supply shocks and reestablish labor market equilibrium”
(Borjas, 1994a).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some stylized facts about the
housing conditions of immigrants. It also describes the scant previous research about the
impact of immigration on housing markets, and the empirical challenges of such an exercise.
Section 3 reviews some ideas that are relevant to the economics of immigration and housing
prices. I lay out a simple model that studies the response of the housing market in the short
run and the long run. The model also contemplates mobility by natives and the interplay
between labor and housing markets. Section 4 describes the data sources. Section 5 introduces
the methodology and results of the paper. Section 6 concludes.

2.

The empirics of immigration and housing

Few papers have addressed the topic of immigration and the housing market. A number of
studies describe the housing condition of immigrants. We know that immigrants tend to live in
rental housing (JCHS, 2000, Burnley, Murphy and Fagan, 1997) and in housing units of lower
quality, especially during the period just after they arrive (Thave, 1999; Friedman,
Rosenbamum and Schill, 1998). We also know that immigrants tend to consume less with
respect to housing services: crowding is more frequent in immigrants’ households (Myers, Baer
and Choi, 1996).6 Over time, immigrants tend to resemble natives more in terms of crowding,
home ownership and suburbanization patterns (Callis, 1997; Myers, 1999; Myers and Lee,
1996, Myers and Park, 1999).
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The demographic literature on crowding defines it as when a housing unit holds more than one person per

room (not including kitchens, baths and the like).
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Much less is known about the impact of immigrants in destination cities. Muller and
Espenhade (1985) report that rental housing experienced major price increases in Los Angeles,
compared to other American metropolitan areas, during the period 1967-83. Los Angeles was
one of the most important “gateway” cities for immigration in that period. The authors go on
to explain this finding: “because most immigrants live in rental units, the rental housing
market would experience substantial pressure from the rising immigrant-induced demand.”
The evidence points to housing markets as a possible way to find the local effects of
immigration.
Burnley, Murphy and Fagan (1997) report that immigration is one of the important correlates
of short and long-term inflation of housing prices in Sidney, the main immigrant city in
Australia. Ley and Tuchener (1999) find a similar time-series correlation between housing
prices and immigration in Toronto and Vancouver, Canada. These studies are descriptive in
nature. The authors do not control for other variables that could account for changes in
housing prices, such as economic cycles.
Research in this area presents several challenges. Firstly, omitted variables that are not
observed by the researcher could be driving both immigration inflows and housing costs.
Immigrants may respond to other factors that cause rents to increase, such as expectations of
future economic growth, improved amenities or changes in the preferences for existing
amenities. In principle, this could lead the researcher to overestimate the impact of
immigration on rents. Note, however, that this could be less of a concern for the impact of
immigration on housing values, since capitalization of forecastable future amenities should
have occurred ex ante.7 Secondly, immigration could be endogenous. Immigrants may be
looking for better deals: they might decide to settle in places where rents are increasing more
slowly. If immigration inflows are very sensitive to housing costs then the estimates of the
relation between immigration and rents could be biased downward. In this context, we need to
look for exogenous sources of variation in the immigration inflows to ascertain causality.
Saiz (2003) provides evidence of a causal relationship between immigration inflows and
housing rents. I used the “Mariel Boatlift” 8 as a natural experiment, following Card’s
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This latter argument hinges on the efficiency of the housing market.

8

About 150,000 Cuban refugees arrived in the United States between May and September 1980. They had

been allowed to flee from Cuba after political turmoil in the island. A short-lived decision by the Castro
government granted them a permit to leave. Many of these immigrants (some estimated 80,000) decided to
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(1990) study about labor market outcomes. This immigration shock represented an
exogenous increase of 9% in the Miami renter population in one year (or about 4% of the
total population). I showed that rents increased 8% more in the Miami metropolitan area
than in the rest of metropolitan Florida and two other groups of comparison cities.
Immigration was the most likely explanation for this differential growth in rents; but the
differences-in-differences approach that Saiz (2003) uses has shortcomings that are worth
mentioning. Different trends in the “treatment” and “control” groups can generate
spurious results. 9 This criticism does not claim there is a systematic bias in the diffs-indiffs estimates, but suggests a potential lack of power of the methodology. A second
shortcoming of the differences-in-differences approach is that, even if the econometrician
can establish causality, the estimates need not be generalizable. Saiz (2003) measures the
impact of a very big unexpected immigration shock on a very particular housing market,
at a specific point in time.

3.

The economics of immigration and rents

Why should we be specifically interested in the impact of immigration on rents? How is
immigration different from general population growth? Is it surprising to find a substantial
impact of immigration on local housing markets? From a housing market perspective, several
facts distinguish immigration from general population growth.
Immigrants are much more spatially concentrated than natives. This is the housing market
equivalent of the difference in the skill composition of the immigrant and native populations in
the labor market (Borjas, 1994b). Consider the 20 major metropolitan areas by the levels of
new legal immigration in the period 1983-1997 (Table A.1). Two thirds of all metropolitan
immigrants (immigrants in metropolitan areas) moved into metropolitan areas that
represented only one third of the United States’ metropolitan population. More than half of
the new immigrants settled in only ten Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), which contained
just 20% of the metropolitan population. About 20% of Americans lived in non-metropolitan
areas in 1980. Only 4.34% of immigrants admitted during the 1983-97 period reported settling
settle in Miami because of the proximity of Southern Florida to Cuba and the fact that a major Cuban
émigré community was already present there.
9

Other factors may have been at play in Miami during the early 80s. These factors may have affected rents

differently in that metropolitan area. Angrist and Krueger (2000) show how another failed “Mariel boatlift”
in 1994 −thousand of Cubans took to the sea that year but were prevented from landing in Miami by the US
Navy− could have been interpreted as having a negative effect on wages using a diffs-in-diffs methodology.
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outside metropolitan areas. We can thus expect the effect of immigration to be stronger on
specific housing markets. The factors attracting immigrants to “immigrant cities” are different
from the factors motivating natives to migrate. Immigrants are attracted to cities with strong
immigrant and ethnic networks. Natives are, by and large, indifferent to these networks. Some
of the factors that explain migration by natives are employment, wages, amenities and,
critically, housing prices – they tend to look for less expensive locations. Thus it would not be
surprising to find a mild correlation between changes in housing prices and changes in native
population. Immigration inflows may be more independent from changes in housing supply
factors that explain rent growth.
Yet it is not obvious that we should actually see a local correlation between immigration and
housing rents. Consider one of the arguments in the labor literature. Natives may move out or
avoid areas where immigrants settle because of the competition in the local labor market. If
immigrants substituted for natives “one for one” in the labor market, then we would not see
any increase in the local demand for housing. Finding a positive local effect of immigration on
rents allows us to reject the strong null of “complete displacement” in the labor market.
A similar argument applies to competition in the housing market. Immigrants may be less
sensitive to housing rents, because local immigrant-specific amenities and networks are more
important for them. Natives, though, may be more sensitive to local rents. If this is the case,
immigration inflows could spur net out-migration of natives because of the increased housing
costs that are associated with a housing demand shock. There is no way to separate the effect
of increased housing demand (immigration) from the potential decreased demand (native outmigration). Part of the local response to the treatment (immigration) can occur through native
out-migration. In this case, we need to be careful about the interpretation of the coefficient of
immigration on rents. In general it will not correspond to the housing supply elasticity.
Nevertheless, we should expect a positive effect of immigration on rents if natives are not
infinitely sensitive to changes in housing costs, and if they are not displaced “one for one” in
the labor market.
I introduce a simple model that incorporates all these ideas. This model can be used as a
roadmap to understand the local impact of immigration on housing. It is structured around
the idea of spatial equilibrium with simple supply and demand schedules. The focus is on
partial equilibrium: I concentrate on the effects of immigration on a city, which I will name
city C. The model contemplates housing supply and the mobility of natives.

6

Start by assuming that the preferences of native residents can be represented by the following
separable utility function:
U iC = ViC + α

(1)

h (1−θ ) − 1
+ wC (N ) − R ⋅ h
(1 − θ)

ViC is the value of local amenities in city C for individual i, h is the consumption of housing
services by the individual. wC is the going wage in city C ; all city dwellers are assumed to be
also workers and wC to be a function of the population ( N ). R stands for housing rents (the
annual cost of a dwelling). The model abstracts from income effects in housing consumption.
1

α  θ
The optimal consumption of housing in this setup is given by h =   .
R 

The preferences for the city’s amenities are distributed uniformly. We can order individuals
according to their preferences for the city’s amenities: {0,..., i} . Assume that the preferences
for each individual can be represented thus: ViC = A - a × i . I also use a linear approximation
for the demand of labor: wC = wC − ρ ⋅ (NC + N I ) . N C is the number of native residents
and N I is the foreign-born population in C
The utility level outside the city is u . Residents in the city prefer staying to emigrating, so
U iC ≥ u , "i Î C . The marginal native will be indifferent between staying at C and leaving.
A − a ⋅ NC +

(2)

1
θ −1
θ
α
⋅ αθ ⋅ R θ −
+ wc − ρ ⋅ (NC + N I ) = U
1−θ
1−θ

From this equation we derive the supply of natives in C :
NC =

(3)



{

1
θ −1
1
θ
⋅ Ω − ρN I +
⋅ αθ ⋅ R θ
1−θ
(a + ρ)

, where Ω = A + w −U −

}

α 
.
1 − θ 

Immigrants are attracted to particular cities because of the existence of previous immigrant
communities. Local public goods (such as social networks, schools, language usage, and
existence of restaurants and specialized shops) increase the amenity value of such cities from
their point of view. The existence of such immigrant-specific amenities in some cities is a well-

7

established fact in the literature.10 Table A.2 illustrates this point. It shows the correlation
between changes in non-immigrant population, total legal immigration and several other
variables between 1983 and 1998. Immigration to an MSA is very strongly and positively
correlated with the previous density of the foreign born population (with a remarkable
correlation coefficient of 0.89). Other population growth is only weakly correlated with the
immigrant stock. This clearly points to the existence of differential amenities for the native
and foreign-born population.
I model this amenity differential by assuming the following amenity value for all immigrants at
city C: ViC = AIC , where AIC ³ A is an amenity premium for immigrants in “immigrant
cities.” For the purposes of this work, the only distinction between immigrants and natives is a
preference for specific “immigrant” cities. Immigrants will always prefer C. I treat the supply
of immigration into city C as exogenous to the initial spatial equilibrium. My empirical
specifications try to make this assumption as accurate as possible.
The optimal consumption of housing services for immigrants will be identical to the
consumption of natives. Let total population N = NC + N I . The total demand for housing
services is equal to the number of residents times the consumption per resident ( N × h ).
Taking logarithms of this identity:
(4)

ln H D = ln (NC + N I ) +

1
1
⋅ ln α − ⋅ ln R
θ
θ

Let’s first analyze the effects of an unexpected immigration shock in the short run. I define the
short run as the situation in which supply of housing space and native population cannot
change (because of arbitrarily high adjustment costs in the short run). Differentiating equation
(4) with respect to the number of immigrants, we obtain the short run impact of unexpected
immigration:
(5)

10

dR
dN I

= θ⋅
H =H ,NC =NC

R
N

Edin, Fredriksson and Åslund (2003), and Munshi (2003) provide convincing evidence on the importance

of ethnic enclaves and local immigrant networks. Some examples of the sociological literature on the topic
include NRC (1997,) Portes and Rumbaut, (1996), Rumbaut (1997). Zhou (1998) reports that “over two thirds of
the legal immigrants admitted to the United States since the 1970s are family-sponsored immigrants. Even among
employer-sponsored migrants, the role of networking is crucial. Family, kin, and friendship networks also tend to
expand exponentially serving as a conduit to additional and thus potentially self-perpetuating migration.”
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So the percentage change in rents depends on the “immigration impact” (number of
immigrants over population) and the elasticity of the demand for space. All of the adjustment
in the short run comes through changes in the demand for space of residents.11
For expected immigration shocks, or for learning about the dynamic effects of unexpected
shocks, we have to consider both the adjustment of the housing supply, the response of native
population, and changes in housing space consumption.
The price elasticity of housing supply is assumed constant:
(6)

ln H S = β0 + β1 ln P

It is well known that changes in housing prices exhibit a high degree of auto-correlation (Case
and Shiller, 1999). Contrary to what happens in other asset markets, contemporary changes in
prices have predictive power over future price changes. Prices do not fully adjust
instantaneously despite the fact that the agents can estimate the steady state price. In order to
illustrate the dynamics of housing prices I follow recent papers in the real estate literature,12
which postulates an error correction process with respect to the steady state price ( P * ).
∂P
= λ ⋅ (P * −P )
dt

(7)

The steady state housing price capitalizes the steady state housing rent at interest rate i.13
(8)

P* =

R*
,
i

ln P * = ln R * − ln i

or

What is the steady state impact of an immigration shock on housing rents? Housing demand
(4) equals housing supply (6) in the steady state (I henceforth drop the stars in the steady
state variables for ease of exposition). Combining the equilibrium condition with

(8) we

obtain:
(9)

ln R =

ln (N

1 {
β + 
1


11

1

θ 

C

+ NI ) +

1
⋅ ln α − β0 + β1 ⋅ ln i
θ

}

This effect can be interpreted as reduction in vacancy rates, increased crowding or conversion of other

spaces to residential usage.
12

Meese and Wallace (1997), Malpezzi (1999), Capozza, Hendershott, Mack, and Mayer (2002).

13

i can be interpreted here more generally as the user cost of residential capital.

9

Differentiating with respect to N I :
1 dR
1
1
⋅
=
⋅
1  N

R dN I
β1 + 

θ

(10)


∂N C ∂ R
∂NC ∂w 

⋅ 1 +
⋅
+
⋅

∂R ∂N I
∂w ∂N I 

From equation (2), which defines NC = NC (R (N I ), w (N I )) we know that:
1



αθ

= −  1
∂R
 R θ ⋅ (a + ρ ) 



(11)

∂NC

(12)

∂NC
∂w

⋅

∂w
ρ
=−
∂N I
(a + ρ )

Substituting in (10) and rearranging yields:
1

dR
a ⋅ Rθ
=
1−θ
1

1
dN I
β1 +  ⋅ N ⋅ (a + ρ ) ⋅ R θ + α θ

θ

(13)

The impact of expected immigration inflows (or the long run effect of unexpected shocks) is
smaller than the short run impact of unexpected shocks. New supply of housing, changes in
the consumption of space, and out-migration of natives account for this result. At the same
time, even in the long run, immigration is expected to have an impact on rents and prices in
receiving cities as long as there are natives with a positive consumer surplus derived from
living in city C. It is straightforward to show that:
∂

dR
dN I

∂β1

∂
<0 ,

dR
dN I

∂ρ

∂
<0,

dR
dN I

∂a

∂
> 0 , and

dR
dN I

∂θ

> 0 14

Thus the impact of immigration on rents is lower in cities with elastic housing supply or, less
intuitively, in cities with inelastic labor demand, and higher in cities with low price elasticity of
housing demand or inelastic supply of natives (i.e. low mobility).
Although not central for the empirical exercise in this paper, it is interesting to discuss some
aspects of the interaction between labor markets and the housing impact of immigration.
14

For the later result, I assume that the initial consumption of space is greater than 1 unit (h>1).
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Concretely, consider the strong null hypothesis that natives are displaced one by one from the
city because of competition in the labor market. This would certainly explain the apparent
lack of a wage impact of immigration in cross-sectional studies. Formally this can be expressed
∂NC ∂w
ρ
⋅
=−
= −1 . For this condition to hold, it is necessary that either a = 0
as
∂w ∂N I
(a + ρ )
(i.e. natives are extremely mobile and sensitive to changes in consumption), or ρ → ∞ (totally
dR
= 0 . Thus,
inelastic labor demand). Both of these cases imply, in equation (13) that
dN I
finding a local impact of immigration on rents helps us to discard the strong null hypothesis of
complete displacement in local labor markets.
But then again, wouldn’t it be enough to look at population (or employment) net inflows to
ascertain if immigration has a local economic impact? The answer to that question is no.
Think about a city with a very inelastic housing supply. Assume that the demand for space is
relatively inelastic, maybe because of indivisibilities in the existing housing stock. Under this
scenario most of the impact of immigration is on housing rents, as opposed to population. As
the size of the labor force does not change much, the wage impact of immigration is bound to
be small. An outside observer of this scenario may conclude that competition in the labor
market drives natives out of the city: i.e. labor demand is inelastic or the supply of natives is
very elastic. In fact, neither of these two needs to be true. New immigrants are simply willing
to bid up for locations at immigrant cities.
What are the dynamics of rents and prices after an immigration shock? From equation (7) we
obtain:
(14)

P (t ) = P * − (P * −P (0)) ⋅ e −λt

Where P * is the steady state price after the immigration shock and P (0) is the initial steady
state
∂P
∂N I

price. From (8) it follows that in the steady state comparative statics
1
∂R 1
⋅ =
⋅ , and thus from (15) that (P * −P (0)) > 0 . The housing market is in
∂N I R
P

equilibrium at any point in time:
(15)

β0 + β1 ⋅ ln P (t ) = ln (NC (t ) + N Ifinal ) +

1
1
⋅ ln α − ⋅ ln R(t )
θ
θ

The supply of natives is a function of rents at time t and using (3):

11

β0 + β1 ⋅ ln {P * − (P * −P (0)) ⋅ e −λt } =

(16)

{

}

θ −1
1
 1
 1
θ
1
ln 
⋅ Ω − ρN I +
⋅ α θ ⋅ R(t ) θ + N Ifinal  + ⋅ ln α − ⋅ ln R(t )

(a + ρ )
1−θ
θ
 θ

Differentiating with respect to time and rearranging we can show:
β1
λ ⋅ (P * −P (0)) ⋅ e −λt
∂R(t )
=−
⋅
<0
1
 1

H (t )
∂t
 α θ ⋅ R(t )− θ
1 
+


(a + ρ ) ⋅ N (t ) θR(t )

(17)

In the model, rents experience a shock after the immigration inflow and decrease thereafter
toward the new steady state, which is higher than the initial one. Thus one has to be careful
separating the short run and long run impacts of immigration on rents. Concretely,
identification techniques based on unexpected major shocks, as in Saiz (2003), will tend to
overestimate the long run impact of immigration, while identifying its short run effects.
Furthermore, note that general population growth need not be associated with increasing
rents. The native population is attracted by areas with low housing costs and is thus
endogenous to the rent level. Positive shifts in the housing supply that cause reductions in b 0
in the model are associated with bigger populations and smaller housing rents. The correlation
between native population growth and changes in rents needn’t be identical to the correlation
between exogenous immigration inflows and rent growth.

4.

Data

In order to assess the impact of immigration inflows on housing markets I have assembled data
on rents, housing prices, immigration, income, employment and other characteristics of the US
metropolitan areas during the periods 1983-1997, and decennial data for 1970-2000. In this
section I describe and summarize the data that I use in the empirical part. A more detailed
explanation of how variables are constructed can be found in the data Appendix.
One data source for the immigration inflows is the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) “Immigrants Admitted to the United States” series. The main variables for this work
are the nationality of the immigrant and the zip code of intended residence. I construct yearly
immigration inflows by metropolitan area from 1983 to 1997 matching zip codes to 1993
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metropolitan statistical areas using the census MABLE geo-correlation engine.15 It is
remarkable that the datasets contain annual individual information on all legal immigrants
admitted in the United States. However, the data have several caveats that make it less than
optimal. The timing of the admission of a foreign person as an immigrant needn’t coincide
with the date of entry into the US. Also, the data do not yield any information on illegal
immigrants.
But there are several advantages that make the data attractive. First, most immigrants are
admitted shortly after they arrive in the US. In 1990, the median year in my sample, 70
percent of admitted immigrants entered the country the same year in which they were
admitted. About 90 percent of the immigrants admitted in 1990 report having arrived in the
United States in or after 1988. Moreover, admission as an immigrant is by itself a treatment of
considerable interest, since the counterfactual may imply having to leave the country or
lacking the ability to work, and since it can be useful to forecast the impact of future
immigration inflows with the data that is available annually. Thus I will treat these data as a
noisy indicator of recent immigration inflows, and obtain a panel with about 292 MSAs and 15
years’ worth of data. The measurement error will typically lead us to underestimate the
impact of immigration when using higher frequencies.16 Second, the data give us information
about the nationality of all recent immigrants and I can link this with changes in economic
and social conditions in their origin countries. Third the data provide information on the
original destination of the immigrant so that the treatment is plausibly more exogenous to the
subsequent evolution of rents in the metropolitan area.
An alternative data source for the number of immigrants by city is provided by the census.
Concretely, I use the change in the decennial number of foreign-born individuals by MSA. The
benefits of using the census tabulations are that they enumerate both legal and illegal
immigrants (and other inflows of foreign-born individuals) and that they provide a relatively
accurate head-count of the number of immigrants by metropolitan area. The costs of using the
census tabulations are the reduction in the periodicity (only each ten years), the loss of some
micro information,17 and the fact that, between censuses, immigrants may decide to resettle to
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I calculate immigration inflows using calendar years rather than fiscal year (both are present in the data).
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Note that the instrumental variables approaches will also help us deal with attenuation bias.

17

Census micro data samples do not allow to identify all metropolitan areas. Moreover, there is no detailed

information on year of arrival in the present metropolitan area.
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locations that are becoming relatively cheaper. In any case, it is remarkable that the results
from using both types of immigration data are very similar.
A data source for rents in MSAs is the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD) Fair Market Rent series (FMR). Fair market rents for a fiscal year are determined
before October of the previous calendar year. 18 I use the year in which FMR are calculated to
define my rent variable. I then match these yearly data on rents to the immigration data for
the period 1983-1997. The FMR corresponds to the price of a vacant 2-bedroom rental
unit at the 45th percentile of the MSA’s distribution. It is calculated annually by HUD
using data from the census, AHS and CPI samples, when available, combined with local
random samples. The FMR can be interpreted as the price for a rental unit of about
average quality.19 Data on rents and other characteristics of rental units also come from the
1985 and 1995 national samples of the American Housing Survey. Finally, I obtain similar
results using median rent data by metropolitan area from the census. Data on housing prices
comes from the Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae (FM) repeated sales index and from reported
median house values by MSA from the census.20
Data on the evolution of population and income at the MSA level are from the BEA Regional
Information System (REIS). Unemployment rates at the metro level are obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Other data on the characteristics of the central cities are
obtained from the County and City Data Book (1998). The stock of immigrants in 1980 come
from the 1980 Census, County Data. I obtain the longitudinal data on housing permits from
the Census “Construction Reports: Series C40.”
Several data sources are used for the countries of origin of the foreign born. My main data
sources are the “World Bank Indicators” and the IMF “Financial Indicators” databases. Data
about military conflicts and governance failures are from the “Internal Wars and Failures of
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The 2002 fiscal year, for example, spans from October 2001 to the end of September 2002.

19

From 1996 on, HUD changed the definition of FMR to the rent for a unit in the 40th percentile. HUD

provides data for both the 45th and the 40th percentile in 1995. I use the ratio of rents in both percentiles
and the evolution of rents in the 45th percentile from 1995 to extrapolate the evolution of rents in the 40th
percentile.
20

In table 6 I combine the Freddie Mac data from repeated sales data from the Office of Federal Housing

Oversight (OFHEO) in order to improve the coverage of the data.
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Governance 1954-1996” database, from the Center for International Development and Conflict
Management at the University of Maryland.
The main unit of observation in most of the empirical work is the MSA-year. In Table 1, I
provide some descriptive statistics for the MSAs in 1990. I define the yearly immigration
impact as the number of new immigrants divided by the current population. The average city
(means are population-weighted) received a yearly inflow of immigrants equivalent to 0.3% of
its initial population. But the variance of this impact is considerable. The maximum impact in
1990 was 1.4% of the population, in Miami. Miami was also the city with the greatest share of
foreign-born population in 1980 (35.55%). Overall, about 8% of the urban population was
foreign-born in 1980.
The rest of the variables summarized are used as controls in most regressions. Amenities such
as crime and temperature (the log of heating degree days), and the initial share of population
with a bachelor’s degree are important determinants of population growth (Glaeser, Kolko and
Saiz, 2001, Glaeser and Shapiro, 2001; Rappaport, 1999). The log of central city area may
capture supply factors related to zoning. Changes in local income and the local unemployment
are also important determinants of rent and housing values (Jud, Benjamin and Sirmans,
1996). I include these variables with one lag in the basic specifications. All regressions control
for year dummies, which capture national trends in inflation and other economic variables. In
some of the regressions I also control for state fixed effects and the growth of the native
population in the city.
Appendix Table A.2 is helpful in describing the correlates of the variable of interest. In the
regression in panel B, the total number of immigrants (1983-98) over population (1983) is the
dependent variable. Again, the most important predictor of immigration is the stock of foreignborn in 1980. Immigration partially correlates with central city area, the percentage of the
population with a bachelor’s degree (positive), and with income growth and cold weather
(negative).

5.

Methodology and Results

5.1.

Least squares results

In section 3 I established that, ceteris paribus, the immigration impact should be one of the
determinants of rents and housing price growth. The empirical model that I posit takes the
form:
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(I)

∆ ln (rit ) = β ⋅

immiit −1
popit −1

+ α ⋅ X i + µ ⋅ ∆Z it −1 + φt + εit

The dependent variable is the annual change in the log of rents.21 Taking differences in the
rents series increases the noise to signal ratio of the dependent variable but gets rid of cityspecific characteristics that account for rent levels. The main independent variable is annual
inflow of legal immigrants (INS data) over population. b has an intuitive interpretation here
as the percentage change in rents corresponding to an annual inflow of immigrants equal to
1% of the city’s population. As rents do not adjust instantaneously to changes in fundamentals
(Genesove, 1999) I use lagged values of the dynamic independent variables. To decide on the
lags in the dynamic explanatory variables I used the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
concluded that the specification with one lag was the “most likely.”22
Levin and Lin (1992) tests on the data for rents, and prices reveal stationarity in the first
differences. Thus spurious regression seems not to be problem in this specification, though note
that if there is a longer term cointegrating relationship between rent levels and the size of
foreign born population we may be underestimating the parameter of interest.23
Table 5 shows the results of the first differences specification. I present the OLS regressions
with standard errors clustered by MSA. I also show regressions using maximum likelihood
estimation of a model with ARMA(2,2) perturbations to address the possible existence

21

I have estimated more general dynamic panel data models that use the current rent as dependent variable

and one lag in rents as independent variable, besides the other variables in the model. I implemented the
GMM procedure in Arellano and Bond (1991), but specification tests failed to confirm the validity of the
model, since second order autocorrelation in the residuals was detected. The qualitative results are similar
for rents, but the specification for prices is extremely sensitive to changes in the set of explanatory variables.
22

The AIC is commonly used to settle on the lag specification of time-series models: the specification that minimizes

AIC is usually chosen. I posit specifications similar to the one in Table 2, column 1, but with different lags for the
dynamic variables (immigration, income and employment rate). Notice that the rest of variables do not change
over time, and cannot be lagged. I restrict the sample to the number of observations of the specification with the
greater number of lags (four), to enable the comparison of the models. The model with one lag in the dynamic
dependent variables minimizes the Akaike information criterion. See Appendix Table A.3.
23

This problem suggest using long differences to estimate such long-run relationship, which I will implement

later.
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autocorrelation and moving averages.24 There is evidence of both autocorrelation and moving
averages in the data. It is not surprising that unobserved factors affecting rents and housing
prices display such time persistence at the MSA level. In this setup, OLS is a consistent but
relatively inefficient estimator. The results (columns 1,2,4 and 5) show that immigration is a
significant explanatory variable for changes in rents. Results are fairly robust across
specifications and suggest that rents increase by about 1% with an immigration impact equal
to 1% of the city’s population. The estimate for prices are bigger and more imprecise. The
price series displays greater volatility than the rents series, and most of the estimates of the
price regressions have bigger standard errors.
The shortcoming in the estimates is that a major part of the variance in immigration inflows is
between cities. Omitted variables that are differentially present in cities with high immigration
inflows, and that might account the growth in rents in these cities (such as amenities whose
valuation increases over time), are a potential threat to my interpretation of the results. A first
solution to the potential problem is to control for omitted variables that are common to all
MSAs in a state. These may be, for instance, geographical advantages, regional demographics
and state-specific shocks that are not captured in the income and employment variables.
Columns (3) and (6) show the first-differences regressions including state fixed-effects. This is
equivalent to allowing state specific trends in the evolution of rents and prices. The results do
not change much; differences in immigration between cities within a state seem to have an
equally strong impact on rents.
To eliminate the possibility of city-specific trends that are correlated with immigration levels I
make use of the model in second differences:
(II)

∆2 ln (rit ) = β ⋅ ∆

immiit −1
popit −1

+ µ ⋅ ∆2Z it −1 + φt '+ ξit

The model is identified through changes in the general level of new immigration into a
city. Even if immigrants are generally attracted to a city because of factors that also
drive the trend in rent growth, year to year changes in immigration inflows should be
relatively independent of those factors. Do rents accelerate when immigration
accelerates? The answer to this question is also in Table 2: yes. At the same time that
24

The covariance of the difference of the perturbation terms is different from zero for two consecutive

observations: cov(εt − εtt −1, εt −1 − εt −2 ) = −E (εt2−1 ) . By construction, the new perturbation is a moving average
of the contemporaneous and past perturbation.
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the specification in second differences prevents the omitted variables problem, the results
capture the impact of unexpected immigration. Differences in the immigration inflows by
year can be interpreted as “surprises.” As the model predicted, unexpected changes in
immigration cause higher rent growth. The estimate is large compared to those of the
other methods: an increase in immigration equal to 1% of the population induces a rent
hike of 3.75%. Changes in prices are not significant in this specification.
5.2.

Instrumental Variables Estimates

In this section I develop an instrumental variables’ strategy to deal with the endogeneity
problem. The evidence I obtain will be generalizable to regular (expected) immigration flows,
and will not be dependent on major immigration “shocks.”
I make use of two kinds of instrumental variables. The first instrumental variable approach
focuses on year-to-year changes in immigration inflows. There are good reasons to believe that
the overall number of legal immigrants in the United States stems from political and
administrative decisions.25 I make use of this variation to construct a “shift-share” prediction
of the inflows by city and year. Total immigration levels in the US are translated into
expected immigration by city. I use the cities of destination of immigrants in 1983, the first
year for which I have data on the location of legal immigrants, and the formula:
(III)

·=
immi
k ,t

φk ,1983
(1 − φk ,1983 )

(

)

· ⋅ [1 − φ ]
⋅ immi
US ,t
k ,t

· is the predicted number of new immigrants in city k and year t , immi
· is the
immi
k ,t
US ,t

total number of new immigrants in the United States in year t , and φk ,t is the share of
immigrants who move into city k in year t. This prediction is independent of city and time
specific shocks. Two basic identification assumptions are made. First, I assume that immigrant
inflows in 1983 are not driven by omitted variables that will affect rents in the future. In other
25

Successive “Immigration Acts” have established a cap to the total number of immigrants in the United

States. The number of applicants has always exceeded the total cap. In 1994, for example, the U.S State
Department had 3.6 million people registered in a “waiting list” for family reunification visas: the supply of
immigrants is virtually infinite and the total number of immigrants admitted depend on administrative and
legal decisions. In recent years, administrative backlogs have been an important determinant of the year-toyear level of immigrants into the United States. The INS estimated that legal immigration during the fiscal
years 95-98 period would have been 450,000-550,000 higher in the absence of the backlog.
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words, immigrants in 1983 did not predict the future evolution of housing rents and prices
better than the participants in the local market.26 The second identifying assumption is the
exogeneity of annual changes in the national immigration inflows to the economic conditions of
immigrant cities.
The second IV approach relaxes this second assumption and consists in estimating annual
immigration inflows by country and year. To do so, I use variables that are exogenous to
changes in city-specific amenities. Once I have predicted immigration inflows by country and
year I calculate the share of immigration by country into each MSA in 1983. I apply this share
to predict the number of immigrants from each country into that city for the period 19841998. Finally, I consolidate these flows to obtain the total predicted immigration by city-year.
This instrument takes the form:
M

(IV)

·
·
· = ∑φ
·
immi
⋅ immi
k ,t
i ,k ,1983
i ,US ,t
i =1

·
· is the predicted number of new immigrants in city k at time t , φ
immi
is the share of
k ,t
i ,k ,1983
·
· is the predicted
immigrants from country i who settled in city k in 1983, and immi
i ,US ,t
number of new immigrants from country i and time t in the United States. M is the total
number of countries that sent immigrants to the U.S.
Appendix Table A.4 presents the results of a panel random effects model for the prediction of
the number of immigrants by country. The dependent variable is the logarithm of immigrants
from each country in a given year. The explanatory variables include lagged values of several
of the sending countries’ characteristics: the log of income per capita, log of population, log of
the real exchange rate, dummies for the presence of miltary conflicts, collapse of state
institution and transition out of communism, and the log of the number of immigrants from
that country in 1979 (the first year for which the data is available). Income per capita is
negatively related to the number of immigrants sent to the Unites States. The log of a
country’s population is also a significant determinant of the number of immigrants from that
country. Real exchange rates have been shown to be an important determinant for Mexican

26

Prices capitalize the discounted value of future rents and I find similar or bigger impacts of immigration on housing

prices throughout the paper. Therefore, if one believed in the ability of immigrants in 1983 to pick the future
“winner” cities (1984-1997) based on the available information, one has to explain why local participants in the
housing market did not capitalize on the available information ex ante.
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immigration (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999). I measure the exchange rate as the unit of
foreign “gadgets” that one can buy by selling a “gadget” produced in the U.S, priced at U.S
prices and given the current exchange rate and prices in the sending country. Since this
magnitude does not have a cross-sectional interpretation I use the exchange rate in 1979 as a
benchmark. Results suggest that the greater the real purchasing power of the dollar in a
country, the greater the expected immigration from that country. Military conflicts, collapse of
state institutions and transition out of a communist regime are also positive determinants of
emigration to the United States. The variable with the biggest explanatory power is the level
of immigration by country in 1979. Overall levels of immigration by country are persistent.
Information, history and American foreign policy, ethnic networks and permanent differences
in the policies of sending countries may be important determinants of the country-specific
levels of emigration to the United States.
The prediction of immigrants by country and year does not use the estimated random effects.
The estimated country effects maybe correlated with factors that made it attractive to
immigrate into the cities where immigrants of that nationality clustered during the 1984-98
period. The random effects estimate of immigration will thus be a linear combination of only
the exogenous variables in Table A.4.
Once I have obtained the predictions by country, I apply the share of immigrants from that
country that decided to settle in each city in 1983. From this I obtain predictions of the
number of immigrants by nationality and metropolitan area. Adding these inflows by MSA, I
obtain a prediction of immigrants per MSA and year.
Table A.5 portrays the first stage of the 2SLS estimation. In the first two the dependent
variable here is the annual inflow of immigrants into a city, and the main explanatory variable
is the predicted inflow of immigrants. Both the instrument based on the national level shiftshare (column 1) and the instrument based on sending country characteristics (column 2)
work very well. F-test values for the instruments are around 300. In fact, most of the variation
in these inflows is between cities, and changes in the annual levels of immigration and the
characteristics of sending countries account for a lesser part of the variance in the instruments.
Thus, I can predict general immigration flows by city during the 1984-1997 period well by
using the destinations of immigrants in 1983.
Table 3 presents the basic results using instrumental variables. The results are similar than
those in the OLS specification. In columns (1) and (2) I use the shift-share of the total number
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of immigrants admitted in the United States as an instrument. Columns (3) and (4) present
the results with the instruments derived from predicting immigration by country. The results
suggest estimates of around 1 for rents and 2 for housing prices.
5.4. Long differences
This section assesses the robustness of the estimates from the dynamic model. I use long
differences in rents and prices and the cumulative number of INS-reported immigrants as the
main dependent and explanatory variables. The specification attempts to answer an important
policy question: what is the impact of immigration in the long run? If the impact of
immigration is nonlinear, or the impact of immigration on rents takes a long adjustment
period (i.e. immigration and rents are cointegrated),27 the estimates from our previous
specifications may be quantitatively far from the actual long run effect. An additional
advantage of the specification using “long” changes in rents and cumulative immigration is
that they rely less in the reported timing of immigration, and are thus less sensitive to
attenuation bias or potential non-classical measurement error in the yearly inflows.
Table 4 presents the results for rents and prices respectively. The left-hand-side variable is the
change in the log of rents (prices) from 1984 to 1998. The main right-hand-side variables is the
“potential supply” of immigrants over initial population (i.e. the total cumulative number of
immigrants who reported settling in the city during the period 1983-1997 over population in
1983).28 Since most cities experience population growth, using the initial population in the

27

Cointegration tests in this context are not extremely informative. The time dimension is very short (13

periods). Furthermore, the null hypothesis of cointegration usually involves cointegration of all of the MSA
series: rejecting that hypothesis does not imply that some or even most of the series are cointegrated.
28

There are three arguments on why such “potential supply” is the treatment of interest. First, immigrants

are no less concentrated in locations with major immigrant populations after 20 years residing in the United
States (Ferrie, 1996b). This suggests a strong “stickiness” of immigration to the initial “ports of entry.”
Indeed, in footnote 29 I provide evidence between the one-to-one relationship between cumulative number of
immigrants and change in population. Second, one may be interested in the “intention to treat” impact of
immigration. Even if some of the immigrants leave the areas of initial settlement, it is important to know
how the housing market responded for each immigrant that arrived in a city, in order to derive policy
implications and forecasts, with the immigration data available. Third, and more importantly, “potential
immigration” is the actual potentially exogenous treatment variable of theoretical interest. Internal
migration of immigrants will be caused by changes in the conditions of the cities where the immigrants
settle. These changes are endogenous to initial immigration inflows. We know that the local wage effects of
immigration are small. Thus, a substantial part of an eventual out-migration of the foreign-born from
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denominator of this variable yields conservative (low) estimates of the parameter of interest. I
also control for the changes in the log of income per capita during that period, and the rest
variables that describe the initial conditions: unemployment, weather, crime, central city area,
and percent with bachelor’s degree in 1980.
The results are very robust across all specifications and suggest impacts on rents and prices of
0.8-1.6% for an immigration inflow that amounts to 1% of the initial population. In general,
point estimates for housing prices are higher, but I cannot reject that they are equivalent to
those for rents. Columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 use the cumulative prediction from the origin countries’
random effects estimation as an instrumental variable. In columns 3 and 6 I include the change
in population other than immigrants (change in total population minus the estimated number
of legal immigrants)29 over initial population as an additional explanatory variable. The
correlation between this variable and changes in rents and prices is not significant. Natives
seem to be attracted to areas with relatively slow rent growth. However, as we will see latter,
measurement error in the intercensal estimates of metropolitan population (1983 and 1997) is
probably biasing down the association between population growth and changes in rents.
5.5. Quality
Another issue is the quality of the housing units in the HUD sample. The Freddie Mac (FM)
measure of prices is based on a repeated sales index. The same units are tracked in time, and
changes in quality must be small. The Fair Market Rent measure does not have this property.
If the quality of housing increased systematically in “immigrant cities,” maybe because
growing cities tend to have housing units of newer vintages, my estimates could just be
reflecting the effect of quality on rents. Conversely, immigration could actually be associated
“immigrant cities” might be attributed to local changes in housing costs. It is clear that people who have left
a city because of the high housing costs are still part of the demand of housing in that city (if the price was
low enough they would have bought housing services in the city). To clarify this point, imagine a city with a
completely inelastic housing supply. Assume that everyone consumes the same quantity of housing services.
In this setup, any immigration inflow will be associated with a population outflow of the same magnitude.
Still, the greater the number of immigrants the greater the demand for housing in the city and the higher
the rents: the number of net migrants to the city would be the wrong variable to use.
28

Results do not change much if I include the lagged independent variable in a simple fixed effects model

(unreported regression available on request).
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Running the regressions in table 4 with the relative change in population as dependent variable yields a

coefficient of 0.70 on the immigration impact (standard error 0.277): I cannot reject that each cumulative
potential immigrant predicts one new MSA inhabitant.
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with lower qualities, and the previous results would then be biased downward. I address this
issue using microdata from the 1985 and 1995 samples of the American Housing Survey. 30 The
AHS provides several quality indicators that I will use as controls. An additional advantage of
using the AHS is to check on the robustness of my previous findings on alternative data
sources. In Table 5, the log of reported rent for each unit in both years is the left-hand-side
variable. The interaction of the population impact of the cumulative number of INS-reported
immigrants in the MSA (1984 –1994) and a 1995 dummy captures the impact of recent
immigration on the change in rents between 1985 and 1995. Other explanatory variables are
change in income and the interaction between city characteristics and the 1995 dummy. MSA
fixed effects model explicitly the covariance between observations in the same MSA.31 The
quantitative results are remarkably similar to previous specifications (0.8% extra rent growth
for 1% impact), despite the fact that the time frame is different (10 years from 1985 to 1995),
and the fact that the AHS tracks a much smaller number of metropolitan areas (only 141).
Areas where immigrants settled tended to experience higher rent growth. The introduction of
quality indicators (column 2) does not change the coefficient of interest.
5.6.

The foreign-born, rents and prices: using the decennial censuses.

The INS provides data about illegal immigrant apprehensions and estimates of the net
flows of illegal immigrants in several issues of the “Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.” Unfortunately, the estimates of the illegal net
inflows are not disaggregated at the metropolitan area level. Moreover, the estimates of
illegal immigration are imprecise and do not change much from year to year. A
shortcoming of the data that I have used so far is that it does not include figures for
illegal immigrants. We need to interpret the results so far as the treatment effect of legal
immigration on rents and housing prices. This would not be problematic if illegal
immigration was uncorrelated with legal immigration inflows. Unfortunately, this is an
unlikely assumption. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that the exclusion of
illegal immigrants may not affect the primary qualitative conclusions so far. Firstly, the
estimated figures for net illegal immigration during the period correspond very well with
the figures of emigration of legal residents. According to the Census Bureau (INS, 1999)
about 260,000 foreign-born residents emigrated annually from the United States in the

30

I restrict the sample to private metropolitan rental units for which the rent is reported.

31

As most units appear in both samples, I further cluster standard errors by unit.
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90s. The estimated number of annual illegal aliens entering the country was 281,000 for
1988-92 and 275,000 for 1992-1996 (INS, 1999). The effects of illegal immigration and
emigration of the foreign-born may cancel each other to some extent. Secondly, it is
unlikely that the correlation between legal and illegal inflows is equal to one.
In any case, a way to approach the issue of the foreign born persons who are not legal
immigrants is by using census data counts at the MSA level. The census counts most foreignborn residents, irrespective of their immigrant status.32 The other advantage of using the
census over the INS data is that it is free of measurement error in the reporting of the
locations where the foreign born person decides to settle. The main disadvantage of the census
is its periodicity. I will only be able to consider the “long” changes in rents and prices between
the census years for which I have complete data (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000). The other
disadvantage of the census is that we do not obtain the MSA in which the immigrant first
settled. Actual residence in an MSA may be endogenous to the rent level in the city.
Theoretically, with a very inelastic housing supply, new immigration could have an impact on
rents even if the net migration of the foreign born into the city is small. Using instrumental
variables techniques may help us deal with that problem.
Table 6 presents the results from a regression where the decadal change in the census-reported
log of the median rent or house value in the MSA are the main dependent variables. The
change in the number of the foreign-born between two census years over population in the
initial year is the main explanatory variable. As a data check for the quality of the selfreported data, and in order to account for some of the changes in unobserved quality, I also
present the results with the repeated sales index. The data is a panel of 283 MSAs with
complete data and 3 decades of growth in the foreign-born population. I use similar controls as
in the previous regressions.33 OLS results (columns 1, 4 and 9) are remarkably consistent with
the previous specifications. The parameter of interest is robust to the use of very different data
sources.

32

There may be some concerns about the undercount of illegal immigrants in specific areas, but we can

hardly improve on the census counts.
33

The MSA definition here is the 1999 county-based one (see data Appendix). I have data for murder rates

(and not homogeneous data on serious crimes) by MSA only in 1980, 1990 and 2000, so I use
contemporaneous murder rates on the right-hand-side (excluding crime does not change the coefficient of
interest in any of the tables). There are a good deal of missing observations for the unemployment rate in
1970 so I use lagged employment rates (total employment over population).
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Columns 3, 6 and 10 introduce MSA fixed effects. The fixed effects should control for the
impact of city-specific amenities (or changes in the valuation of amenities) that were associated
with rent growth during the period.34 The identification there comes from quantitative changes
in immigration within a city, rather than on the cross-sectional variation in the share of
immigrants. Clearly, rent and house price growth in a city accelerated in the decades with
bigger immigration inflows. The parameter estimates are bigger than with the OLS
specification, albeit the parameters are more imprecisely estimated. The fact that rent and
price growth accelerates when immigration inflows accelerate is consistent with a causal
interpretation of the results.
In columns 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, and 12 I use an IV strategy in order to deal with the fact that
changes in the location of the foreign-born are driven by housing costs and may be correlated
with other relevant omitted variables. I predict the MSA change in the foreign-born according
to the formula:
(V)

∆foreignit = ∆foreignUS ,t ×

foreignit −1
foreignUS ,t −1

Where foreignit is the number of foreign-born people in city i at time t , and foreignUS ,t the
number of foreign born in the US at time t . This basically amounts to multiply the initial
level of the foreign born by the national growth rate in the number of foreign born persons,
and thus is in the tradition of using initial immigration levels to predict subsequent inflows
(Altonji an Card, 1991). I then divide by initial population to generate a prediction for the
expected immigration impact in each city. The results suggest a somewhat lower elasticity of
about 0.5 for rents and prices.35 When we control for other population growth, however, the
estimates increase and suggest an elasticity of 0.8. The change is explained by the fact that the
partial correlation between changes in native population and the initial share of the foreign
born is negative. The census measure of the change in the native population yields a strong
positive impact of population growth on rents and prices. However, and consistent with the
34

Note that adding fixed effects to a model in differences will increase the noise-to-signal rate in the

dependent variable. In this case, however, I have decennial changes in rents and prices, which are bound to
be much less noisy than annual changes.
35

Unfortunately I cannot combine the IV and fixed effects approach. The shares of the foreign born by city

do not change much in each decade and the city and year fixed effects capture all of the variance in the
instrument. The instrument is not significant in the first stage with MSA fixed effects and the F-statistic for
the excluded instrument is only 0.80.
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idea that native migration is more endogenous to local changes in the cost of living, this
association is about 2-3 times weaker than the association between immigration and rent
growth.36
5.7.

The distribution of the estimates

At this point, I have presented a good deal of estimators that yield a very consistent picture:
immigration pushes up rents and prices in the cities of destination. While point estimates on
the impact on rents are all surprisingly close, more uncertainty surrounds the point estimates
for housing values. This was to be expected, since housing values’ series typically display
greater volatility than rents. But if we are willing to accept a common data generating process
for the impact on rents and prices, as the model suggested,37 figure 1 is useful. Figure 1 shows
a kernel density estimate of the 32 parameters in tables 2-6. It is quite apparent that the mode
of the estimates is around 1. I think that it is thus fair to conclude that an exogenous
immigration impact that amounts to 1% of the initial population in a metropolitan area
pushes up average rents and prices by around 1%.

6.

Conclusions

This paper shows that there is a local economic impact of immigration in American cities.
Immigration pushes up the demand for housing in the destination areas. Rents increase in the
short run and housing prices gradually catch up. The association between immigration and
rents appears to be causal. Acceleration or deceleration in the immigrant’s inflows within a
city is associated with acceleration or decelerations in the evolution of rents.
Instruments based on the characteristics of sending countries, the immigration level by country
of origin in 1979 and the geographical distribution of immigrants by country in 1983, and
instruments based on the year-to-year changes in national immigration levels and 1983
patterns of settlement, all yield similar result. Areas where one would expect immigrants to
36

I have conducted two further robustness checks. First it is interesting to note that the results do not

change much if we exclude Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York MSA, which have been salient areas of
rent growth in recent periods. Second, it also interesting to point out that the strong correlation between
immigration and rent/value growth is still very strong if we omitted the control variables (except for the
time dummies, which capture national levels of inflation and other general components of rent growth). The
coefficients are around 0.5-0.6.
37

Ongoing and future research by this author will analyze the impact of immigration in the different

segments of the local housing markets.
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settle experienced higher rent and housing price evolution, regardless of the economic shocks
and different fates experienced by the cities during the 15-year period between 1984 and 1998.
The results also hold for census data for the 1970-2000 period. And they are very robust to the
use of different data sources (Freddie Mac price index, HUD Fair Market Rents, American
Housing Survey rents, Census median house prices and rents, INS legal immigrant data vs.
census counts of the foreign-born) and time periods.
An immigration inflow that amounts to 1% of the initial metropolitan area population is
associated with, roughly, a 1% increase in rents and housing values. One should be cautious
about the interpretation of these results. Renters will be less attracted by immigrant cities
with relatively higher housing costs, but homeowners experience a capital gain. Immigration
does seem to have a local distributive impact.
In any case, the results need to be taken into account to understand how immigration inflows
are spatially arbitraged away. To illustrate this point, it is useful to benchmark the results in
this paper to the results in the wage literature. The population-weighted average share of the
foreign-born in the US (metropolitan areas in the 2000 census) is 12%. To increase this share
by 1% the average city needs an immigration inflow equal to 1.15% of the initial population.
Using the modal estimate in the paper this could increase rents by 1.15%. Arguably, as the
labor literature seems to point out to, a 1% increase in the share of immigrants depresses
wages by 0.03%. The typical renter-occupied household spends about ¼ of their income in
rental payments. This amounts to a loss of purchasing power of about 0.28% if they decide to
stay and don’t alter their housing consumption, which is an order of magnitude bigger than
the effect through the labor market! Workers in sectors and occupations different than those in
which immigrants tend to cluster are participants in the housing market. Clearly, housing
rents and prices must be important explanatory variables in further research about the
interplay between immigrants, labor markets, and the mobility of natives.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics (1990)
Population Weighted
Variable

Non-weighted

Mean

Std. Dev.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

562

130

490

107

321

930

New immigrants/population

0.003

0.004

0.0015

0.002

0.000

0.016

Immigrant stock in 1980/ 1980 population

0.076

0.066

0.045

0.046

0.005

0.356

Income per capita

21003

3627

18487

3455

9335

31516

Unemployment rate

5.411

1.681

5.763

2.275

2.100

22.300

Heating degree days

4299

2106

4574

2221

199

10816

Central city area (square miles)

134

155

70

135

3

1732

Serious crimes per person in 1985

0.089

0.032

0.077

0.034

0.000

0.384

Percentage with bachelor's degree in 1980

17.241

6.516

17.945

8.065

5.500

59.500

Rent

Notes: Observations at the MSA, PMSA level. The number of MSA (with complete observations) is 296.

TABLE 2
Immigrant Inflows and Annual Log Rent Changes
∆ Log rent

∆ Log price

∆2 Log rent

∆2 Log price

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1.148
(0.378)***

1.100
(0.236)***

0.842
(.288)***

1.912
(0.403)***

2.328
(0.383)***

1.916
(0.366)***

3.759
(1.681)**

-1.597
(1.128)

0.058
(0.048)

0.091
(0.0370)**

0.070
(0.043)

0.668
(0.098)***

0.163
(0.032)***

0.155
(0.032)***

0.104
(0.058)*

0.092
(0.036)**

-0.142
(0.027)***

-0.106
(0.027)**

-0.102
(-0.030)***

-0.420
(0.074)***

-0.240
(0.045)***

-0.261
(0.04047)***

-0.046
(0.139)

-0.488
(0.097)***

Log heating degree days

0.00003
(0.001)

0.0004
(0.001)

0.004
(0.002)*

0.006
(0.001)***

0.008
(0.001)***

0.008
(0.003)**

Log central city area

-0.001
(0.0006)*

-0.001
(0.0006)*

-0.0004
(0.001)

-0.004
(0.0009)***

-0.005
(0.0008)***

-0.0006
0.001

Serious crimes per person, 1985

0.041
(0.011)***

0.043
(0.0147)**

0.025
(0.017)

0.056
(0.027)**

0.016
(0.027)

0.020
(0.022)

0.004
(0.007)

0.069
(0.076)

0.012
(0.008)

-0.016
(0.013)

-0.013
(0.013)

0.003
(0.000)

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes
No
No

New immigrants per population at T-1
2
∆ Log income at T-1 (∆ Log income)

Unemployment rate at T-1 (∆ unemployment rate)

Share with bachelor's degree 1980

Year fixed effects
ARMA(2,2)
State fixed effects

Observations
4118
4118
4118
2170
2170
2170
4005
2211
R-squared
0.19
ML
ML
0.22
ML
ML
0.10
0.11
Notes:
Standard errors (clustered by MSA) in parentheses. ∆ indicates first difference, ∆2 second differences.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
First differences for years 85 to 98: observations with all explanatory variables complete. Second differences for the 86-98 period: all observations with dynamic variables (immigration, income,
unemployment) complete.
ML: Estimated using maximum likelihood. "Basic" disturbances are assumed to follow the normal distribution.
The table shows the results of a regression where the annual change in the logarithm of rents (prices) is the dependent variable and the number of new immigrants divided by population in the
previous year the main independent variable of interest. Rent and price data are from 1984 to 1998, and for all MSA with complete observations (unbalanced panel data). The regression also controls
for annual changes in log income and employment rates, and for other time invariant MSA variables.

TABLE 3
Immigrant Inflows and Annual Log Rent Changes: Instrumental Variables
US levels instrument

New immigrants / population at T-1

∆ Log income at T-1

Unemployment rate at T-1

Year fixed effects
Other MSA variables in Table 2

Origin country instrument

∆ Log rent

∆ Log price

∆ Log rent

∆ Log price

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1.211
(0.323)***

2.193
(0.455)***

1.150
(0.323)***

2.570
(0.488)***

0.058
(0.048)

0.668
(0.098)***

0.058
(0.048)

0.667
(0.099)***

-0.143
(0.027)***

-0.427
(0.076)***

-0.142
(0.027)***

-0.437
(0.076)***

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Observations
4118
2170
4118
2170
R-squared
0.19
0.22
0.19
0.22
Notes:
Standard errors clustered by MSA in parentheses. ∆ indicates first difference.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
First differences for years 85 to 97: observations with all explanatory variables complete.
The table shows the results of a regression where the annual change in the logarithm of rents (prices) is the
dependent variable and the number of new immigrants divided by population the previous year the main
independent variable of interest. Rent and price data are from 1984 to 1998, and for all MSA with complete
observations (unbalanced panel data). The regression also controls for annual changes in log income and
unemployment rates, and for other time invariant MSA variables.
The "US levels instrument" uses the total number of immigrants in the US each year and the share of
immigrants going to each MSA in 1983 to predict the number of immigrants by MSA and year. The "origin
country instrument" is a prediction of MSA yearly immigration inflows based on "expected" immigration by
country and the shares of immigrants of each nationality settling into each MSA in 1983.

TABLE 4
Legal Immigrants and Rents: Long Differences
∆ log rents (84-98)

∆ log prices (84-98)

OLS

IV

IV

OLS

IV

IV

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Immigrants (1983-1997) / 1983 population

0.868
(0.204)***

0.914
(0.214)***

0.935
(0.214)***

1.668
(0.302)***

1.581
(0.312)***

1.607
(0.326)***

∆ Log income 1983-1997

0.496
(0.081)***

0.498
(0.081)***

0.498
(0.081)***

0.984
(0.137)***

0.979
(0.137)***

0.987
(0.140)***

Unemployment rate 1984

-0.587
(0.233)**

-0.590
(0.233)**

-0.564
(0.234)**

1.964
(0.458)***

1.974
(0.459)***

1.983
(0.462)***

Log heating degree days

0.014
(0.010)

0.015
(0.010)

0.019
(0.010)*

0.089
(0.017)***

0.087
(0.017)***

0.089
(0.018)***

Log central city area

-0.010
(0.007)

-0.010
(0.007)

-0.010
(0.007)

-0.054
(0.009)***

-0.054
(0.009)***

-0.054
(0.009)***

0.591
(0.195)***

0.585
(0.195)***

0.541
(0.199)***

0.175
(0.270)

0.179
(0.270)

0.176
(0.271)

0.110
(0.081)

0.108
(0.081)

0.081
(0.084)

0.220
(0.134)

0.225
(0.134)*

0.214
(0.141)

Serious crimes per person, 1985

Share with bachelor's degree 1980

Change in native population (1983-1997) / 1983 population

Constant

Observations
R-squared
Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

0.052
(0.043)

0.017
(0.067)

-0.043
(0.114)

-0.050
(0.115)

-0.088
(0.119)

-0.900
(0.177)***

-0.878
(0.178)***

-0.902
(0.200)***

288
0.24

288
0.24

288
0.25

153
0.54

153
0.54

153
0.54

The table shows the results of a regression where the long difference (change from 1984 to 1998) in the logarithm of rents (prices) is the dependent
variable and the number of new immigrants during the period 1983-1997 divided by initial population (1983) is the main independent variable of interest.
Rent and price data are from 1984 to 1998, and for all MSA with complete observations. The regression also controls for annual changes in log income and
employment rates, and for other time invariant MSA variables.
The IV (instrumental variables) specifications use the "origin country" instrument. The "origin country instrument" is a prediction of MSA yearly
immigration inflows based on "expected" immigration by country and the shares of immigrants of each nationality settling into each MSA in 1983.

TABLE 5
Micro Data AHS: Rents and Qualities
Log rent at T (T=1985,1995)
(1)

(2)

0.796
(0.180)***
0.765
(0.131)***
-0.050
(0.381)
0.001
(0.013)
-0.014
(0.007)*
-1.136
(0.290)***
-0.398
(0.149)***
0.262
(0.119)**

0.872
(0.177)***
0.713
(0.125)***
-0.194
(0.363)
0.003
(0.012)
-0.017
(0.007)**
-1.236
(0.278)***
-0.338
(0.140)**
0.312
(0.115)***
-0.060
(0.013)***
-0.018
(0.015)
-0.011
(0.020)
0.028
(0.010)**
-0.028
(0.014)*
-0.132
(0.015)***
0.0004
(0.0003)
0.081
(0.017)***
0.130
(0.006)***
-0.005
(0.0001)***

MSA fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Year fixed effects

Yes

Yes

15692

15692

0.3

0.38

Immigration impact × 1995
Log MSA income T-1
Unemployment 1984 * 1995
Log heating degree days * 1995
Log central city area * 1995
Crime 1985 * 1995
Share bachelors * 1995
1995
Cracks in walls
Leaking ceiling
Heat down on winter
Fuses blew last 3 months
Peels in paint
Rats or mice
Number of units in building
Elevator present
Number of bedrooms
Age of building

Observations
R-squared

Notes:
Standard errors clustered by unit in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Immigration impact stands for the number of immigrants during the 1984-1994 period divided
by 1984 population. The impact is instrumented by the prediction from the "origin countries"
IV.

TABLE 6
Census Data: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000
OLS
(1)

∆ Log median Rent
FE
IV
(2)
(3)

IV
(4)

OLS
(5)

∆ Log median home value
FE
IV
(6)
(7)

∆ Log repeated home sales index
(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

0.800
(0.220)***

1.815
(0.307)***

4.882
(2.029)**

0.578
(0.403)

0.813
(0.391)**

1.371
1.316
(0.112)*** (0.103)***

1.630
(0.154)***

1.531
1.539
1.551
(0.514)*** (0.155)*** (0.150)***

New (10 year) immigrants per initial population

0.937
(0.111)***

1.938
(0.357)***

0.562
(0.114)***

0.771
(0.128)***

1.957
(0.231)***

2.673
(0.727)***

∆ Log income

0.860
(0.063)***

0.934
(0.092)***

0.839
(0.063)***

0.814
(0.059)***

1.461
(0.112)***

1.675
(0.175)***

Employment Rate at T-10

-0.270
(0.171)

-0.903
(0.410)**

-0.126
(0.175)

-0.257
(0.161)

0.076
(0.321)

-1.778
(0.831)**

0.695
(0.358)*

0.413
(0.303)

0.570
(0.455)

0.085
(2.376)

0.842
(0.438)*

1.027
(0.452)**

Log heating degree days

-0.008
(0.005)

0.064
(0.014)***

-0.018
(0.005)***

0.011
(0.007)

0.034
(0.007)***

0.069
(0.028)**

-0.009
-0.009

0.053
(0.011)***

0.059
(0.011)***

0.051
(0.055)

0.027
(0.014)*

0.055
(0.014)***

Log central city area

-0.008
(0.002)***

0.016
(0.012)

-0.007
(0.002)***

-0.009
(0.002)***

-0.011
(0.004)**

0.100
(0.022)***

-0.008
(0.004)*

-0.013
(0.004)***

-0.032
(0.006)***

Murders per 100,000 inhabitants

0.002
(0.0007)***

0.003
(0.002)

0.002
0.003
(0.0006)*** (0.0008)***

0.001
(0.001)

0.009
(0.003)***

0.001
(0.001)

0.003
(0.001)**

0.002
(0.002)

0.002
(0.013)

0.001
(0.002)

0.003
(0.002)

Percentage with bachelor's degree at T-10

-0.004
(0.0005)***

-0.006
(0.004)

-0.003
-0.004
(0.0006)*** (0.0006)***

-0.005
(0.001)***

-0.045
(0.007)***

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.004
(0.001)***

-0.004
(0.001)***

-0.077
(0.034)**

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.002
(0.001)

Change in native/population at T-1

Decade fixed effects
MSA fixed effects

0.349
(0.236)

0.212
(0.039)***
yes
no

yes
yes

yes
no

yes
no

0.283
-0.029
-0.033
(0.125)** (0.006)*** (0.006)***

0.458
(0.065)***
yes
no

yes
yes

yes
no

yes
no

0.294
(0.102)***
yes
no

yes
yes

yes
no

yes
no

†
†
†
261†
261
261
261
MSA
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
Observations
849
849
849
849
849
849
849
849
414
414
414
414
R-squared
0.88
0.9
0.88
0.89
0.79
0.84
0.78
0.81
0.38
0.67
0.34
0.37
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
† Unbalanced panel for 1990 and 2000.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The table shows the regression where the intercensal change in the log of median rents or house prices is the main dependent variable and the change in the number of immigrants over initial MSA population the main independent
variable. All changes between Census years (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000). Most control variables take values in the initial census year. Instrumental variables use the total decennial change in foreign born interacted with the share of
foreign-born population in the initial year.

Figure 1. Kernel density of the paper’s estimates
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Appendix TABLE A.1
Major Immigrant Cities (1983-1997)

Population 1983

Legal immigrants 19831997

8384789
7890314
1725589
7259019
3632843
1531795
2072418
3150230
1367215
1843567
5359877
2003313
1953448
4791248
1298675
2621072
2249095
1712491
566829
4229636

1576355
1057856
435697
408727
338378
253691
243263
215113
206228
186436
182568
174730
163320
146834
143482
132523
125081
113649
106735
105756

10 Biggest Immigrant Cities
% Metropolitan US

38,857,779
19.90%

4,921,743
53.07%

12.67%

20 Biggest Immigrant Cities
% Metropolitan US

65,643,463
33.61%

6,316,422
68.11%

9.62%

Rank MSA
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

New York
Los Angeles-Long Beach
Miami
Chicago
Washington
San Francisco
Anaheim-Santa Ana (Orange County)
Houston
San Jose
Oakland
Boston
San Diego
Newark
Philadelphia
Bergen-Passaic
Nassau-Suffolk
Dallas
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett
Jersey City
Detroit

Notes : All magnitudes at the PMSA or MSA level
*(Immigrants /1983 Population), total immigrants obtained as the sum of legal immigrants in fiscal years 1983 through 1997.

Impact*
18.80%
13.41%
25.25%
5.63%
9.31%
16.56%
11.74%
6.83%
15.08%
10.11%
3.41%
8.72%
8.36%
3.06%
11.05%
5.06%
5.56%
6.64%
18.83%
2.50%

Appendix TABLE A.2
Correlates of MSA Legal Immigration Inflows

Panel A: Partial Correlations of Interest
New immigrants
(1997-1993) /
Population 1983

Other Population
Growth (19831997) / Population
1983

1

0.168

Other Population Growth (1983-1997)/Population 1983

0.168

1

Log Rents 1983

0.515

0.146

Foreign Born/Population (1980 Census)

0.891

0.083

Change in log income 1983-1997

-0.128

0.029

Change in log employment level 1983-1997

0.086

0.853

New immigrants (1997-1993)/Population 1983

Panel B: Immigration Flows on Stocks and Control Variables

New immigrants (1997-1993) /
Population 1983
Immigrants/Population 1980

0.624
(0.019)***

Change in log incomes 83-97

-0.022
(0.011)**

Unemployment rate 1984

0.045
(0.032)

Log heating degree days

-0.003
(0.001)*

Log central city area

Serious crimes per person, 1985

Share with bachelor's degree 1980

Constant

Observations
R-squared

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis.

0.003
(0.0009)***
0.036
(0.026)
0.048
(0.0109)***
0.010
(0.015)

289
0.82

Appendix TABLE A.3
Model Selection: Lags in Dynamic Variables
Akaike Information Criterion
∆ Log Rent

∆ Log Price

One Lag

-11410.21

-6055.82

Two Lags

-11378.22

-5944.02

Three Lags

-11357.50

-5896.08

Four Lags

-11291.03

-5885.40

Notes : "Best" model (minimizes the Akaike criterion), in bold.
All models contain MSA variables (Table 2), year fixed effects, and immigration
impact, income and employment rate with the lag indicated in the first column.

Appendix TABLE A.4
Accounting for Immigration
Log immigrants at
T
Log real GDP per capita at T-2

-0.109
(0.038)***

Log of population at T-2

0.265
(0.032)***

Log(exchange rate T-1)-Log(exchange rate 1979)

0.032
(0.013)**

Military Conflict T-2

0.256
(0.061)***

Collapse of State Insitutions T-1

0.458
(0.100)***

Transition out of Communism

1.698
(0.127)***

Log immigration in 79

0.878
(0.027)***

Constant

-2.154
(0.571)***

Observations
Number of countries
R-squared

1936
131
0.896

Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The regressions have the total number of legal immigrants by country and year as dependent
variable and lagged country characteristics as independent variables. Observations for
immigration are for the period 1983-1997 and for 131 origin countries (unbalanced panel).

Appendix TABLE A.5
First Stage for Instruments
New Immigrants per Population
Yearly Differences (INS)
(1)
(2)
Predicted impact (from national level shift-share)

0.954
(0.057)***

Predicted impact (from origin countries RE)

Deccennial (census)
(3)
0.846
(0.070)***

0.847
(0.045)***

Other MSA variables in Table 5

yes

yes

yes

Year fixed effects

yes

yes

yes

4118
0.84

4118
0.87

849
0.62

274.31

343.66

142.71

Observations (N×T)
R-squared
F-test statistic for excluded instrument
Notes:
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

The table show the regressions of actual immigration inflows on the predictions (instrumental variables). The first two columns use
annual legal immigration inflows from the INS. The "national level shift-share" instrument (column 1) uses the share of
immigrants to each city in 1983 and the total number of immigrants in the US to predict immigration inflows by year and MSA
after 1983. The "origin countries" instrument predicts immigration by nationality and year and uses the shares of immigrants by
nationality and MSA in 1983 to predict the total number of immigrants by MSA and year after 1983. The "national level shiftshare" regression in column 3 uses the total decennial national change in the number of the foreign born between Census' years
and the share of foreign-born in the previous census year as instrument for the change in the foreign-born by MSA and year.

Data Appendix
Variable

Definition/notes

Table

Rent

HUD Fair Market Rent. These are obtained directly from HUD by

T1, T2, T3,

MSA. HUD reports rents at the 45% of the rent distribution. After

T4,

th

1996, rents for the 40

th

percentile are reported. In 1995 both the 40

TA.2,

TA.3

and 45th percentile are reported, and I use subsequent growth ratios
to extrapolate 45th percentile rents from 1996 on. The fair market
rent that is applicable to a fiscal year (which starts in October) is
calculated and published during the previous fiscal year. Thus, the
1997 FMR was actually calculated and published in 1996. I use the
year of publication in the empirical specifications.
Rent

American Housing Survey 1985-1995. Self-reported rent in renter

T5

occupied metropolitan households.
Rent

Median MSA rent. HUD State of the Cities Data System (from

T6

Census)
House price
Income

Freddie Mac Repeated sale index. Complemented with data from

T1, T2, T3,

OFHEO (Table 6, 1990 and 2000).

T4, T6, TA.3

Average MSA per capita income from the Bureau of Economic

T1, T2, T3,

Analysis (BEA)

T4, T5, T6,
TA.2, TA.3

Unemployment

At the MSA level. Bureau of Labor Statistics.

T1, T2, T3,

Rate

T4, T5, TA.2,
TA.3

Employment Rate

Total MSA employment from the Bureau of Economic Analysis

T6

(BEA) divide by MSA population (BEA).
Population

MSA Population (BEA)

T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5, T6,
T7,

TA.2,

TA.3
Immigrants

Number of new legal immigrant admissions by MSA (from INS

T1, T2, T3,

“Immigrants Admitted”). Immigrants are matched to 1990 MSA

T4, T5, TA.1,

boundaries

TA.2, TA.3

using

the

Census

Mable

Geocorrlation

engines.

Immigrants in zip codes that are not identified by MABLE are
allocated to MSAs (non-MSA status) using the same proportions in
the rest of the sample.
Immigrants
Heating
days

degree

Head count of the foreign born at the MSA level.

T1,T6

This is an indicator of cold weather. 1988 County and City Data

T1, T2, T3,

Books

T4, T5, T6,
T7,
TA.3

TA.2,

Central City Area

Area (square miles) of the major central city in the MSA.1988

T1, T2, T3,

County and City Data Books.

T4, T5, T6,
T7,

TA.2,

TA.3
Share

with

bachelors

1988 County and City Data Books

degree

T1, T2, T3,
T4, T5, T7,

(1980)

TA.2, TA.3

Share

with

bachelors

HUD State of the Cities Data System (from Census)

T6

1988 County and City Data Books.

T1, T2, T3,

degree

(decennial)
Serious Crimes per
Person 1985

T4, T5, T7,
TA.2, TA.3

Murders

National Archive of Criminal Justice Data.

T6

World Bank -World Development Indicators

TA.4

Population

World Bank -World Development Indicators

TA.4

Real exchange rate

World Bank -World Development Indicators. It is calculated as the

TA.4

100.000

per
persons

(decennial)
Real

GDP

per

capita

(nominal GDP in domestic units/domestic GDP deflator) divided by
(nominal GDP in US $/US GDP deflator)
Collapse of state

Internal Wars and Failures of Governance 1954-1996” database, from

institutions

the Center for International Development and Conflict Management

TA.4

at the University of Maryland.
Transition out of

Takes value 1 for communist countries after 1989 (except Cuba and

communism

North Korea)

Military conflict

“Internal Wars and Failures of Governance 1954-1996” database,

TA.4
TA.4

from the Center for International Development and Conflict
Management at the University of Maryland
Other notes
1.

Tables 1-5 use the 1990 MSA definitions. Data from BEA use 1999 MSAS/NECMA (county based)
definitions, so I use initial population in 1980 and the growth rates of the closest NECMA-defined MSA
(as reported by BEA) to estimate population by year by MSA (1990 defined). To assign income per
capita to the New England MSAs I match the MSA to the NECMA with greater overlap using the
census Mable geocorrelation engine.

2.

Merging immigrant inflows with origin country data: Some of the countries in the INS files disappeared
(merged or split). The World Bank data is reported for currently existing countries. I assign the
individuals from these countries to a major “anchor” country as follows:

Anchor country (World Bank Data)

INS country

Germany

East Germany
West Germany
Northern Mariana Islands
Marshal Islands
Palau
Micronesia
New Zealand
Cook Islands
Niue
USSR
Moldova
Russia
Tajikstan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Kazahkstan
Kyrgyzstan
Czechoslovakia
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Ethiopia
Eritrea
Yemen (Aden)
Yemen (Saana)
Yemen
Spain
Gibraltar
Australia
Christmas Island
Cocos Islands
Yugoslavia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Croatia
Slovenia
Macedonia

Micronesia, Fed. Sts.

New Zealand
Russian Federation

Czech Republic

Ethiopia
Yemen, Rep. of
Spain
Australia
Yugoslavia

3. Incomplete country data: a number of countries have missing data. In those cases (in order to make a
prediction of immigrants by year from those countries) I estimate a random effects model with immigration
from that country in 1979 as the sole explanatory (without the estimated random effects).

